Regulation (EU) 2025/38 laying down measures to strengthen solidarity and capacities in the Union to detect, prepare for and respond to cyber threats and incidents (Cyber Solidarity Act) est un règlement de l'Union européenne identifié par CELEX 32025R0038. La source officielle indique: to lay down measures to strengthen solidarity and capacities in the Union to detect, prepare for and respond to cybersecurity threats and incidents (EU Cyber solidarity act). Source: EUR-Lex et dossier du Parlement européen. Methodology

Regulation (EU) 2025/38 laying down measures to strengthen solidarity and capacities in the Union to detect, prepare for and respond to cyber threats and incidents (Cyber Solidarity Act)

Cette page localisée explique en français les données citées de l'acte, tout en conservant les identifiants officiels, les noms et les sources primaires inchangés.

CELEX
32025R0038
Type
règlement
Date
19 décembre 2024
Procédure
2023/0109(COD)
Commission compétente
ITRE
Étape
Procedure completed

Titre officiel: Regulation (EU) 2025/38 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 2024 laying down measures to strengthen solidarity and capacities in the Union to detect, prepare for and respond to cyber threats and incidents and amending Regulation (EU) 2021/694 (Cyber Solidarity Act)

Ce que fait l'acte

to lay down measures to strengthen solidarity and capacities in the Union to detect, prepare for and respond to cybersecurity threats and incidents (EU Cyber solidarity act). PROPOSED ACT: Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council. ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: the European Parliament decides in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure and on an equal footing with the Council. BACKGROUND: the magnitude, frequency and impact of cybersecurity incidents are increasing, including supply chain attacks aiming at cyberespionage, ransomware or disruption. They represent a major threat to the functioning of network and information systems. In view of the fast-evolving threat landscape, the threat of possible large-scale incidents causing significant disruption or damage to critical infrastructures demands heightened preparedness at all levels of the Union’s cybersecurity framework. That threat goes beyond Russia’s military aggression on Ukraine and is likely to persist given the multiplicity of state-aligned, criminal and hacktivist actors involved in current geopolitical tensions. The Committee on Industry, Research and Energy adopted the report by Lina GÁLVEZ MUÑOZ (S&D, ES) on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down measures to strengthen solidarity and capacities in the Union to detect, prepare for and respond to cybersecurity threats and incidents. The committee responsible recommended that the European Parliament's position adopted at first reading under the ordinary legislative procedure should amend the proposal as follows: Members stressed that close and coordinated cooperation is needed between the public sector, the private sector, academia, civil society and the media. Moreover, the Union's response needs to be coordinated with international institutions as well as trusted and like-minded international partners. To ensure cooperation with trusted and like-minded international partners and protection against systemic rivals, entities established in third countries that are not parties to the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) should not be allowed to participate in procurement under this Regulation. Regarding the new cybersecurity reserve, Members believe it has the potential of developing industrial capacities in the EU, including for SMEs , with investments in research and innovation to develop state of the art technologies, such as cloud and artificial intelligence technologies. In addition, the report proposed to maintain the participation of the industry, enhance the criteria and trust of their participation (i.e. connecting their participation to a national or local company) by clarifying the criteria and the definition of technological sovereignty and to guarantee a balance between non-EU and EU actors. In addition, Members proposed for the Cyber Emergency Mechanism a certification scheme to be used for private providers to build a longstanding and trusted partnership. To support the establishment of the EU Cybersecurity Reserve, the Commission could consider requesting ENISA to prepare a candidate certification scheme for managed…

Sources primaires

Données © Union européenne. Méthodologie.